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INTRODUCTION

The economist Joseph Schumpeter recognized two essential facts of
modern capitalism: (1) the sudden displacement of the old by the new-a
process he eloquently termed "creative destruction"-and (2) the primacy of
innovation over incremental improvements in allocative efficiency to long-run
economic growth.' Examples of creative destruction are easy to come by. In
the early 2oth century the automobile decimated the blacksmith and carriagemaker trades. More recently, email has upended the economics of the postal
service, Craigslist has devastated newspaper classified ads, online shopping
has imperiled bricks-and-mortar retail, and the smartphone has relegated
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See gnerallyJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
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former mobile handset market leaders, such as Nokia and Blackberry, to
obscurity.
The twin Schumpeterian insights-that innovation is the key to growth
and that creative destruction is a vital source of innovation-are now well
accepted.2 How these insights should be incorporated into laws regulating the
market place, such as antitrust and intellectual property, is far less clear.
Antitrust minimalists and skeptics tend to equate Schumpeter with laissez
faire.3 After all, if even the most entrenched market behemoths are vulnerable
to seismic shifts in technology, are not all supposed monopolies merely
fleeting?
We disagree. This view misreads Schumpeter and misunderstands
markets and business strategy. Modern businesses are well aware of the threat
of disruptive outsiders and, left unchecked, will do their utmost to prevent
future waves of creative destruction from threatening the status quo.4 We
propose thinking of creative destruction and competition policy as a two-stage
process rather than a single event where the victor enjoys the spoils of
innovation indefinitely without legal constraints. Instead, competition law as
we currently understand it would remain in place while being somewhat more
forgiving as to the acquisition of market power, yet still vigilant in policing the
maintenance of such power. We focus on historical, current, and hypothetical
examples from US and EU competition and intellectual property law to show
how contemporary law has already incorporated many of these insights and
how the law can maximize consumer welfare by doing so more thoroughly.
Under such a two-step approach, some areas of antitrust and IP law would
expand, some would contract, but all areas of the law would more clearly
promote innovation and help create real Schumpeterian antitrust.
This Essay proceeds as follows. We briefly introduce the concept of
creative destruction and its place in Schumpeter's work in Part II. In Part III
we explain why a truly Schumpeterian competition policy demands more than

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitionfor Innovation 5 (U. of Iowa Legal Studies, Working
2.
Paper No. 13-26, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=2oo8953;
see alsoJoseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological
Progress,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 (1987); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function,39 REv. ECON. STAT. 312 (1957); Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If
InnovationMatteredMost 78 ANTITRUS L.J. 313 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Antitrust as Regulation, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823, 844 (2012);
ThomasJ. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School
of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structuraland BehavioralAntitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 469, 479-81 (2011); Timothy K. Kuhner, ConsumerSovereignty Trumps PopularSovereignty:
The Economic Explanationfor Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, 46 IND. L. REv. 603, 637 (2013);
Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., Creative Destruction: The Essential Fact About Capitalism 31 (June 6,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.artdiamond.com/DiamondPDFs/
CreativeDestructionEssentialFacto3.pdf.
4. Everybody Wants to Rule the World, ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 201 4 ), http://www.economist.com/
news/briefing/2 163 5 o 7 7 -online-businesses-can-grow-very-large-very-fastit-what-makes-them-excitingdoes-it-also-make.
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a laissezfaire approach. We explain why the law must preserve opportunities
and incentives for creative destruction at all stages of innovation and we
review four key policy areas of antitrust law from this innovation-focused
perspective: unilateral conduct cases (Part III.A), cases at the intersection of
IP and antitrust (Part III.B), Sherman Act section i cases (Part III.C), and
merger policy (Part III.D). In Part IV we turn our attention to how the federal
antitrust agencies can prioritize innovation through case selection and
competition advocacy.
II.

SCHUMPETER AND CREATIvE DESTRUCTION

Joseph Schumpeter was one of the most prominent economists of the
2oth century. Born in Austria, he began his professional career as an
economist with a series of economic histories of European industry and a
prolific outpouring of other theoretical work.5 He briefly served as Minister
6
of Finance in the 1919 Austrian government. In 1932, Schumpeter left

Europe and joined the faculty of Harvard University, continuing his long and
fruitful career until his death in 1950.7

He is best known for his 1947 work Capitalism Socialism and Democracy.
Schumpeter famously wrote:
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine
in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new method
of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of
industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates ....

The

opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the
organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such
concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial
mutation-if I may use the biological term-that incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process
of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism ....

In

other words, the problem that is usually being visualized is how
capitalism administers existing structure, whereas the relevant
problem is how it creates and destroys them ....

But in capitalist

reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price
competition] which counts but the competition from the new
commodity. The new technology, the new source of supply, the new
type of organization... -competition which commands a decisive
cost or quality advantages and which strikes not at the margins of the

5.

THOMAS K. MCGRAw, PROPHET OF INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND INNOVATION

67-71 (2007).
6. SCHUMPETER, supra note i, at 97-98.
7. Id. at 2o6.

2226

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 100:2223

profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations
8
and their very lives.
Schumpeter coined the phrase "creative destruction" to describe the
nature of competition and innovation in the 19th and 2oth century markets
he studied. He argued that the process of creative destruction typically
involved a powerful incumbent firm being overwhelmed by new forms of
innovation that radically changed the nature of competition. Later waves of
creative destruction would eventually overwhelm those newly successful firms.
This cycle would continue indefinitely.
Schumpeter saw that creative destruction was essential to capitalism itself.
Creative destruction was a far more significant source of economic growth
than the incremental improvements to resource allocation under price
competition within markets. More controversially, he argued that a substantial
degree of size and monopoly power was conducive to innovation. In
Schumpeter's view, the prospect of market dominance was a powerful
incentive and dominance itself provided the resources for investment in
further innovation.9 Thus, Schumpeter argued that people should not
automatically fear or condemn size and monopoly because these attributes
were necessary conditions and incentives for the type of creative destruction
that was a natural attribute of capitalism. °
Over the past 6o years, scholars have debated whether Schumpeter was
correct descriptively or normatively and whether competition or monopoly is
better suited to the promotion of innovation. Most prominently, Nobel
Laureate Kenneth Arrow argued that competitive markets were a more
reliable generator of innovation than those characterized by substantial
monopoly power." The Schumpeter-Arrow debate has generated a vast
literature on the nature of innovation and the role of competition and market
power.'2 But it is a debate we intend to circumvent on the grounds that the
answer is probably contingent on particular industry characteristics and the
precise degree of industry concentration at issue.'3

8.

Id. at 83-84 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

9.
to.

See generally id. at 84.
Id.

11.

KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 144, 157 ( 3 d ed. 1957).

12. There are also numerous other ways of conceiving of the process of innovation and the
best ways to promote it. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: THE
REVOLUTIONARY BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAYYOU DO BUSINESS 15-26 (2003) (discussing
how "disruptive technology" can harm, rather than help, existing businesses); Michael E. Porter,
The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARv. Bus. REV., March 199o, at 73, 75 (discussing how

information plays a large role in the process of innovation).
13. For the general argument that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between
industry concentration and innovation, see Philippe Aghion, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundel,
Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, Competition and Innovation, an Inverted U-Relationship, 120 Q.J.
ECON. 701 (2005); and Phillippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit & Peter Howitt, What Do We Learn from
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There are literally hundreds of definitions for innovation. Schumpeter
used one geared to new processes and products in his discussion of creative
destruction set forth above.'4 The Oslo manual of the OECD defines
innovation as "the implementation of a new or significantly improved product
(good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new
organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or
external relations.",5 For the purposes of designing and enforcing
competition law, we think a straight-forward definition is that innovation is
"any change in the status quo that (i) allows one to do something one could
not do before or (ii) allows one to do something already possible while using
6
fewer resources than were required before."'
Assuming, as Schumpeter argued, that dominance is vulnerable to
creative destruction and that dominant firms are motivated to continue to
innovate because of the threat of creative destruction, what then is the role
for competition law seeking to promote innovation? This Essay focuses on
how to set priorities for competition law and policy to promote innovation by
seeking to bar dominant firms from engaging in the types of behavior that are
most likely to prevent future waves of creative destruction from threatening
their dominance. Such strategies can prevent the next big idea from
succeeding, limit the disciplining effect of later innovation, and allow a
dominant firm to abuse its power to the detriment of society.
While there is a tendency to equate a love for Schumpeter with an equal
passion for a laissezfaire legal system,,7 that would be a mistake. First, this is
not a fair reading of Schumpeter's own work. The bulk of his writings
consisted of historical analysis of economic thought and market behavior in
the various industries and economic cycles that he studied. He typically
avoided prescribing economic or legal programs for governments.'8 He was

Schumpeterian Growth Theory? (PIER, Working Paper No. 13-026, 2013), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2274704.
14.

SCHUMPETER, supra note 1, at 83-84.

15.

OECD/EUROSTAT, OSLO MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING

available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-andtechnology/oslo-manual_978926401 3oo-en.
16. David McGowan, Innovation and Liabilityfor Contributory Copyright Infringement, 8 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 38, 41 (2009).
17. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman,Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 1o U. PA. L. REv. 577, 623 (1953);
INNOVATION DATA 46 ( 3 d ed. 2005),

Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 688 (2olo);

Ignacio De Le6n, Latin American Competition Policy: From Nirvana Antitrust Policy to Reality-Based
InstitutionalCompetition Building, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 39, 58 (2008) (contrasting Schumpeterian
theory with antitrust policy); Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Innovation and OptimalPunishment,
with Antitrust Implications, lOJ. COMP. L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (2014); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking
Grokster, 2005 WIs. L. REV. 1217, 1278; Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1 18o (2002); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress,62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 998, 1001-02 (1987) (stating that under Schumpeter, antitrust may not be "particularly

important"); Diamond, supranote 3, at 31.
18.

McGRAw, supra note 5, at 179.
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not always opposed to state intervention in the economy, but was most
concerned about the importance of innovation and avoiding reflexive attacks
on big business. Schumpeter's views evolved over time. Despite his general
support for big business, there were times he was critical of monopoly,
opposed governmental entry barriers, and found inequality of opportunity
unacceptable. Second, although the force of creative destruction may be
irresistible over the long run, incumbent firms can suppress disruptive
innovation that threaten their profits in the near future. Schumpeter
recognized this:
[T]here are means available to the successful entrepreneurpatents, 'strategy', and so on-for prolonging the life of his
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position and for rendering it
more difficult for competitors to close up on him.'o
Our evolving experience over more than century of antitrust and
competition laws in the United States, and more than half a century in the
European Union, has shown the wisdom of leaving room for innovation but
continuing to address concerted and individual attempts to block innovation
from rivals.
III. REAL SCHUMPETERIAN ANTITRUST
If laissezfaireis not the answer, what is? A growing body of commentators
seek to identify a vision for competition policy that rewards innovation,
innovators, and entrepreneurs but which does not allow successful firms to

block subsequent innovation that may threaten them in the future. Jonathan
Baker, Tim Wu, and Herbert Hovenkamp among others have written
eloquently in this vein.o

The key for competition law purposes is to look at the process of
innovation and creative destruction as a two-stage sequence rather than a
single-stage operation. Taking Schumpeter seriously means designing a legal
and regulatory system which maximizes the incentives and opportunities for
innovation by challengers to displace incumbents while minimizing the
incentives and opportunities for incumbents to engage in exclusionary
conduct that degrades the opportunities and incentives for future
challengers. This is particularly important given incumbents' tendency to

19. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 897-98 (Elizabeth Boody
Schumpeter ed., 1954); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYcLEs: A THEORETICAL,
HISTORICAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 67 (1964) (explaining how a

monopolist can avoid future creative destruction).
20.

See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES

(201 1); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007); Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation
Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST LJ. 313 (2012); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Schumpeterian Competition

and Antitrust (U. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, Working Paper No. o8-4 3, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 275986.
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exploit their current advantages or engage in limited evolutionary
innovations to maintain that advantage as opposed to the challenger's
tendency to seek revolutionary changes that upend the incumbents.2,
Maintaining openness and opportunity at both stages of the game should
permit entrepreneurs and innovators to flourish. It will also create
appropriate rewards and incentives for both incumbents and innovators while
still maximizing societal benefit. As Professor Waller wrote:
WhileJudge Learned Hand was undoubtedly correct when he wrote
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America that "[t] he successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned
upon when he wins," it is equally important that we do not allow the
current frontrunner in a race to declare permanent victory at the
moment of his choosing.-2
Adding this innovation lens to competition policy will not affect all facets
of competition law. It primarily, but not exclusively, will affect unilateral
conduct cases. However, it does suggest a new way to look at certain concerted
action and merger cases. It may require somewhat more leniency in attempted
monopolization cases but it definitely will demand continued vigilance in
monopoly maintenance cases and other competition cases in which future
innovation is threatened. An innovation-based competition law may also
require a careful coordination of competition policy with sectorial regulation,
intellectual property law, access to infrastructure, and other non-competition
areas of the law.23

Finally, there are good reasons to maintain antitrust enforcement in
other areas of the law which have nothing to do with innovation. Hard-core
cartels and mergers are likely to raise prices or decrease output harm
consumers regardless of their effect on innovation. But taking Schumpeter
seriously does mean prioritizing innovation while shifting focus from
collusion to exclusion.24
A.

INNOVATIONAND UNILATERAL CONDUCT CASES

The Schumpeterian prescription for antitrust law is far from simple.
Schumpeter convincingly argued that innovation is the key to long-run
economic growth and that innovation is closer to a process of punctuated
equilibrium than to steady incrementalism. Antitrust law should promote
creative destruction by reducing artificial barriers to entry wherever possible.

21.
22.

See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 12.
Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1771, 1804

(2012) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)).
23.

See, e.g., SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRYAND MONOPOLY

POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 254-70 (2013); Wu, supra note 20, at 303-o8.

24.

SeeJonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST LJ. 527,

559-62 (2013).
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However, this does not translate to a reflexive preference for the outsider at
the expense of current market leaders. In the language of our two-stage
analysis, Schumpeter convincingly argued the prospect of dominance at Stage
II is the very thing that encourages investment at Stage 1.25 Schumpeter
further reasoned that dominant firms could be an important source of
innovation in light of their greater resources as long as they were motivated
by a fear of creative destruction.
United States antitrust law appears to have absorbed these insights and is
quite solicitous of innovation by dominant firms, but not to the point of
permitting transparent attempts to extinguish new sources of creative
destruction in Stage II. The 2004 Supreme Court decision in Trinko clearly
illustrates the Court's appreciation of the links between success in Stage II and
added incentive in Stage I. In Trinko, the Court dismissed a private class action
complaint alleging that the incumbent phone company had deliberately
interfered with competitor's access to both new and existing customers.26 The
Court noted that to the extent that interconnection was mandated by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the plaintiffs would be limited to whatever
remedies were provided by that regulatory scheme. The Court also questioned
the applicability of the essential facilities doctrine as granting any additional
antitrust rights or remedies where access was part of such a regulatory
scheme.27 Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Scalia stated in classic
Schumpeterian terms:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to
charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts
"business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the
incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.28

The Court thus adopted one of Schumpeter's central premises: punishing
large successful firms reduces the incentives for all firms and their willingness
to take risks.
Classic Sherman Act section 2 cases, such as LorainJournalv. U.S., MCIv.
AT&T and U.S. v. Microsoft, all tell coherent Schumpeterian stories about
incumbents who were attacked not for how they achieved their dominance
but rather how they sought to quash or delay later innovation which

25.

SCHUMPETER, supranote l,at 102.

26.

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,405,416

(2004).
27.

Id.at 4 1o-1i.

28.

Id. at 407.
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threatened that dominance.29 These cases present a vision of antitrust law that
goes well beyond laissezfaire,and for good reason.
In Lorain Journal, an incumbent newspaper was dominant in both
advertising and readership in Lorain County, Ohio.30 This dominance was
threatened by the entrance of a new radio station whose listening area
overlapped with most of the readership of the defendant newspaper.31 To
combat the rise of this form of new media, the newspaper informed
advertisers that they could no longer advertise in the paper if they also
advertised on the radio station.32 This tactic was successful since many
advertisers still needed the newspaper to reach the bulk of their customers
with print ads for grocery stores, car dealerships, department stores and the
like.s3 While this case is universally beloved for different reasons by nearly all
antitrust scholars of every ideological persuasion,4 it also suggests why
Schumpeterian antitrust can be one of vigilance, rather than laxness, even in
the area of unilateral conduct.
A similar dynamic premises virtually the entire regulatory and antitrust
saga of the break-up of the Bell system. The FCC forced the old Bell System
to allow the connection of innovative equipment such as the Carter Hush-aPhone, and eventually a plethora of differently designed and functional
handsets produced by outside vendors.35 It was the private treble damage
litigation brought by MCI which effectively put an end to AT&T's refusal to
interconnect its local loop with MCI's microwave long distance service.36 And
finally, it was the Justice Department's monopolization case and eventual
consent decree which resulted in the divestiture and structural separation of
the Bell System into regional regulated common carriers for local phone
service and unregulated long distance providers and equipment makers to
remove the incentives to interfere with the innovative services and products
of competitors.37
The long-running Microsoft antitrust litigation also reflects the
Schumpeterian tolerance for the creation of monopoly but not its abuse. The
government's case against Microsoft and the D.C. Circuit's 2001 Microsoft
opinion illustrate the type of Schumpeterian antitrust policy currently in
29.
See generally Lorain journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708
F.2d 1o8s ( 7 th Cir. 1983).
3o . LorainJournalCo., 342 U.S. at 146-47.
31.

Id. at 14 7- 4 9.

32.

Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-49.

33.

34.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POuC.Y AT WAR WITH ITSELF 344-45
(2d ed. 1993).

35.
(1968).
36.
37.

See In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 423-24
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 7o8 F.2d io8l,

1148-50

(7th Cir. 1983).

See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135-144 (D.D.C. 1982).
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vogue in the United States.38 The Department of Justice made no effort to
challenge Microsoft's acquisition of monopoly power in the market for
personal computer operating systems.39 Both this broad monopolization and
the earlier, more narrowly focused government cases were focused on
monopoly maintenance claims.4o The D.C. Circuit even went out of its way to
praise Microsoft, noting: "It is certainly true that Windows may have gained
its initial dominance in the operating system market competitively-through
superior foresight or quality."4' It is equally likely that Microsoft achieved
market power because of the combined effect of IBM's decision to get out of
the software business and choice to sell its DOS program to Bill Gates'
fledging company, as well as the rise of the ubiquitous IBM clone running first
MS-DOS and later Windows.4 However, neither the "right place right time"
story, nor the superior skill story, raise cause for concern under the current
stance of competition law toward innovation and creative destruction.
The government's case focused instead on Microsoft's reaction to the
threat of creative destruction posed by the Netscape internet browser and the
Java software platform.4s These innovations threatened to overturn the status
quo in the software industry in which an application program had to be
written for a particular operating system ("OS"). Both Netscape andJava had
the potential to disrupt and eventually destroy Microsoft's OS dominance by
providing an alternative software platform that would enable application
software to run on any OS or potentially without a full function OS at all.44
The government did not take issue with Microsoft's acquisition of a
dominant position or the fact that network effects reinforced its dominance.
Instead, the government's section 2 case focused on Microsoft's effort to
maintain its dominance in operating systems, fend off highly disruptive
innovations, and exclude nascent rivals from the market.45
The government prevailed in U.S. v. Microsoft in the district court on most
of its theories of unlawful monopoly maintenance and obtained both
structural and behavioral relief as a remedy.46 The Supreme Court declined

38.

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

39. See Complaint at i, Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. s:9 8CVo12 3 2),
1998 WL 35241886.
40.

Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3 d at 56.

41.

Id.

42.
See generally Triumph of the Nerds, The Television Program Transcripts:Part II, PBS, http://
www.pbs.org/nerds/part2.html (last visited May 19, 2015); Dylan Tweney, So Long, Bill Gates, and
Thanksfor the Monopoly, WIRED.COM (June 27, 20o8), http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/people/

news/2oo8/o6/gates monopoly.
43. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d at 47, 7444- Id. at 5o, 7 4 .
45. SeegenerallyComplaint, supra note 39, at 1-13.
46. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding for the
government on most theories of unlawful monopoly maintenance), affd inpart,rev'd in part, 253
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to hear the direct appeal under the Expediting Act, and the D.C. Circuit
heard the case en banc. The Court of Appeals issued a nuanced unanimous per
curiam opinion affirming most, but not all, of the government's claims and
reversing the grant of structural relief.47 The issue of innovation was front and
center in the discussion of both unlawful conduct and remedy. The opinion
reflects a balanced Schumpeterian view in three ways.
First, the court gave great deference to product design decisions and
came close to granting per se legality to such decisions (and the bundling
allegations involved) in order to allow defendants to innovate in the dynamic
software industry.48 Similarly, the court tortured existing tying doctrine and
carved out a new rule-of-reason test for software tying. The court refused to
second guess what constituted separate products being unlawfully tied
together by a dominant firm and what constituted new features of existing
products that would serve the needs of consumers and promote innovation.49
Second, Microsoft illustrates that there are limits to dominant firm
behavior in Stage II when it comes to unjustified acts of exclusion. Even with
this innovation lens, the court found that numerous acts and practices of
Microsoft violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. For example, the court
affirmed the trial court's decision that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act
when it deliberately intermingled the computer code for the operating system
and the web browser in such a way that the computer functioned below par if
users operated any web browser other than Microsoft's Internet Explorer.5o
In addition, users could not remove Internet Explorer from the hardware
without crippling the entire OS. All these were illegal since Microsoft could
offer no procompetitive business justification and all evidence pointed to the
only explanation as a long-term scheme to prevent current or future
competitive threats from gaining traction in the market.
Similarly, Microsoft distributed and promoted its own version of Java
software to application developers.5, Despite promising that the Microsoft
type of Java was "pure" and would run on any operating system or software
platform, the Microsoft Java was polluted and would only function in
conjunction with a Microsoft Windows operating system.52 In the absence of
any non-exclusionary justification, the court condemned this as illegal

F. 3 d 34; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000) (ordering
structural and behavior remedies), vacated, 253 F. 3 d 34.
47-

See generally Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34.

48.
Id. at 65 (" [C] ourts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been
harmed by a dominant firm's product design changes. . . . Judicial deference to product
innovation, however, does not mean that a monopolist's product design decisions are per se
lawful." (citations omitted)).

49.
51.

See id. at 84-97.
See generally id. at 67.
Id. at 74 -78.

52.

Id.

50.

IOWA LAW REVIEW

2234

[VOL. 100:2223

monopoly maintenance because it harmed, rather than helped, the
innovation process.53
Third, regardless of what the rule-of-reason case law says about balancing
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, the court did not engage in such
balancing. Instead, it deferred to the incumbent's non-pretextual claims of
innovation. This pattern repeats throughout the opinion. The court used a
rule-of-reason type methodology to require proof of exclusionary effect
whether the specific tactic was a form of exclusive dealing, deceptive conduct,
or other behavior.54 If the government failed to show such exclusionary effect,
it lost. If the government established such anticompetitive harm the court
only then required the defendant to establish some legitimate procompetitive
justification. Where it did so it prevailed,55 where it failed it was found to have
engaged in unlawful monopoly maintenance.5 6 The court never actually
balanced the pro- and anticompetitive effects, as called for in the normal rule
of reason and the D.C. court's own test laid out in the opinion.57 Nor did the
court allow the government to seek liability based on the cumulative effect of
each act, but rather required a separate consideration of each alleged
violation on its own merits.
The Microsoft case illustrates antitrust's deferential approach to
innovation by dominant defendants. However, that deference is by no means
a free pass for conduct aimed at strangling potential sources of creative
destruction in their infancy. The D.C. Circuit reversed liability on bundling
and tying theories. Microsoft lost each count where the evidence showed that
it had interfered with the innovative efforts of others.58 In contrast, when
Microsoft showed some legally and factually plausible claim that its conduct
represented its own innovation for the benefit of its customers, and notjust a
scheme to protect itself from the next wave of innovation, it won.59
Current U.S. enforcement policy regarding unilateral conduct is also
broadly consistent with the Schumpeterian focus on innovation. Most of the
important cases and investigations have not attacked innovation by a
challenger in Stage I but have emphasized attacking conduct by dominant
firms to maintain their dominance and interfere with later waves of
innovation by new challengers. Three important developments emphasize the
growing importance of innovation in the section 2 context. First, the

53.
54.

Id. at 76-78.
See generally id. at 58-59.

55.

See, e.g., id. at 67, 71, 74, 76-78.

56.

See, e.g., id. at 63.

57.

In general, courts rarely engage in this balancing process under the rule of reason. Michael

A. Carrier, The RealRule of Reason:Bridgingthe Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1267-68; Michael

A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 2 St Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827,
828 (2009) (concluding that courts balance pro-anticompetitive effects in only 2% of cases).
58. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d at 67, 71, 74, 76-78.
59. See, e.g., id. at 63.
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government has abandoned (once common) criminal enforcement in section
6
2 cases. o Second, the scope and invocation of attempted monopolization has
been substantially reduced. 6' Finally, agency guidelines now focus explicitly
on innovation as grounds for enforcing or refraining from enforcement,
6
depending on the circumstances of the case. 2
B. IP,ANTITRUST,

AND SCHUMPETER

The intersection of IP and antitrust is often seen as a point of tension. IP
fights, so the story goes, offer incentives for innovation and thus promote
dynamic efficiency. On the other hand, antitrust law concerns itself with static
efficiency and consumer welfare. 63 Herbert Hovenkamp, however, argues that
the patent-antitrust conflict may be "readily exaggerated."64 Hovenkamp
suggests that there are, in fact, only "a small number of cases in which both a
plausible antitrust claim and a countervailing IP policy are present."65 Many
of the apparent conflicts vanish once it is understood that IP rights-although
they create exclusive rights sometimes termed monopolies-do not
automatically create the kind of market power that raises competition law
concerns. This is particularly the case when the competition related doctrines
internal to IP law are properly implemented. 66
The scope of genuine conflicts also recedes once pre-textual arguments
that IP rights provide businesses with a cloak of invincibility for anticompetitive practices are rejected. There is no IP justification for making a
false claim of patent infringement, thus Walker Process claims present no
conflict between the goals of IP and antitrust law.67 Likewise, IP rights might
be the reason for deceiving a standards-setting organization or trying to

6o. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 91-105
(describing aggressive use of criminal monopolization in the 1940s).
61. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 5o6 U.S. 447, 459-6 o (1993).
62.

(2005)

E.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

§ 6.4 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/hmg-2oso.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.32 (c) (2000).
63.

SeeSCMCorp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) ("While the antitrust

laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with
a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.").
64. Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 247 (2007); see
also Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust PolicyforInnovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 637,
637 ("The premise that intellectual property law promotes dynamic efficiency while antitrust law
concentrates on static welfare is wrong, or at least oversimplified.").
65. Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 248.
66. Ariel Katz & Paul-Erik Veel, Beyond Refusal to Deal: A Cross-Atlantic View of Copyright,
Competition, and InnovationPolicies, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 139, 142 (2013).
67. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)
("[T]he enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of [section]
2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a [section] 2 case are present.").
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dishonor a FRAND licensing commitment, but they cannot seriously be taken
as ajustification for such conduct.
Nor are IP settlements immune from antitrust review. The U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decision in Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") v. Actavis Inc.,
instructs lower courts to apply the rule of reason to reverse-payment
settlements-payments from brand-name drug manufacturers to generic
drug manufacturers to delay competition. The Actavis court recognized that
such payments can have significant anticompetitive effects, show market
68
power, and be a surrogate for a patent's weakness.
However, even if the set of conflicts at the intersection of IP and antitrust
is narrower than first conceived, it still exists in relation to essential facilities
and similar related claims. In this respect, the European Union has been far
more active than the U.S. The European Court ofJustice (ECJ) has held that
the existence of intellectual property rights is not a competition law issue but
their exercise may be. 69 The ECJ may require compulsory licensing under
"exceptional circumstances" and has granted access to intellectual property
under the EU version of the essential facilities doctrine.70
The ECJ has used these principles to address competition issues that have
arisen as a result of overly broad national intellectual property rights. In the
Magillcase, the ECJ used competition law to compel access to lists of television
programming so that a non-broadcaster could enter the market and publish
a TV Guide-type publication with listings for all networks in a single integrated
format. Such programming information would not be copyrightable subject
matter in the U.S.,7, but in Europe, competition law intervention was required
to allow third parties to offer novel program information products resisted by
the incumbents.7 This is a result consistent with a Schumpeterian,
innovation-centered, competition policy. A Schumpeterian competition
policy also might have condoned an otherwise problematic joint venture by
the incumbents to offer the same type of new integrated program guide.7s
The Magill court's formulation for abuse of a dominant position required that
a refusal to license prevented the appearance of a new product for which

68. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F. 3 d 1298, 1309 (1 th Cir. 2012),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236-37 (2013).
69. Case 78/70, Deutsche Gramaphone v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 500 113; Cases 56 &
58/54, Grundig & Consten v. Comm'n, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 344-46.
70.
See Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, HarmonizingEssentialFacilities,76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 741, 745-47 (2oo).
71. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991 ).
72. See Valentine Korah, The Interface Between IntellectualProperty and Antitrust: The European
Experience,69 ANTITRUST L.J. 8o1, 814 (2OOs) (citing Case C-24 1/91P & 242/91 P, Radio Telefis
Eireann v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743 (Magill)) (arguing that Magill must be understood as a
way of dealing where a grant of intellectual property rights is questionable in the first place).
73. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (holding
blanket licensing did not constitute per se illegality when the licenses themselves were the new
product being sold).
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there was customer demand, that such refusal was not objectively justified,
and that the refusal reserved to the right holder a "secondary market" (In this
case, the programming guide).
The 2005 IMS Health case blurs the last element, holding that the
introduction of a new product or service is not necessary, but, that mere price
competition is not enough. The test is still fundamentally about innovation,
but it is unclear exactly what counts as innovation.74 More recently, the Court
of First Instance decision in Microsoft further muddied the waters by again
diluting the standard for the EU essential facilities doctrine without a clear
ruling on whether the new entrant was seeking to bring new and innovative
services to the market.75 While there are other reasons that explain the more
robust version of the EU essential facilities doctrine, it has its greatest
legitimacy when it links access to infrastructure to the needs of downstream
innovation.76 A more explicitly Schumpeterian focus could help clarify the
application of the essential facility doctrine to IP in Europe.77
C. SHERMAN ACT SECTION I AND INNOVATION

Section 1 of the Sherman Act deals with anticompetitive agreements
rather than unilateral behavior. Much of section i enforcement involves nonSchumpeterian matters such as traditional hard-core cartels, that are per se
unreasonable, as well as other less suspect agreements which are analyzed
more deeply on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. Nonetheless,
section i enforcement is an important tool when groups of erstwhile
competitors conspire to fend off disruptive innovation.
One of the best historical examples of an agreement between
competitors challenged because of its effects on innovation is Allied Sheet &
Tube v. Indian Head. Manufacturers of steel conduit used to house wiring in
buildings and homes confronted a competitive challenge from newer forms
of conduit made from plastic.

8

The plastic conduit was cheaper, lighter, and

more flexible. The incumbent steel conduit manufacturers banded together
to deny the plastic conduit certification at the next drafting and voting cycle
of the industry building and fire codes. The steel conduit companies simply
packed the relevant meetings with friends and family who narrowly defeated
an initiative to change the existing codes to allow the use of plastic conduit.79
Because these private codes were routinely adopted verbatim into law for state
and local governments, they effectively barred plastic conduit from the
market. While complicated issues, including the application of the Noerr74.

See, e.g., Case T-18 4 /Oi

75.

Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-36oi.

76.

Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing EssentialFacilities,75 ANTITRUST

R, IMS Health, Inc., v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3193.

L.J. 1 (2008).

77.
78.
79.

Waller & Tasch, supra note 7o , at 745-52.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496 (1988).
Id. at 4 9 7.
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Pennington doctrine to the eventual adoption of the private codes by
government occupied much of the Court's opinion,so the Court clearly
prohibited the combined use of public and private entry barriers to stymie an
innovative product from reaching the market. 8'
The Apple E-Books case, now on appeal, is a more recent case presenting
a Schumpeterian model for antitrust enforcement.8 2 The E-Books case was a
successful civil per se section i case by the Antitrust Division against major
book publishers and Apple. The government's theory, which prevailed at trial,
was that in connection with the launch of its iPad tablet computer, Apple
facilitated a horizontal conspiracy by the book publishers regarding both the
method used to price e-books and the amount charged for such books.8 3
Amazon was the first mover in the e-books market with the 2007 launch
of its Kindle e-book reader. By 2oo9, Amazon had a 9o% market share in e-

books and an equally strong position in e-book readers.S4 Amazon had
traditionally purchased e-books at wholesale from the publishers. 85 To build
demand for e-books, Amazon routinely priced e-books at $9.99 or less, a
figure well below the prevailing hardback and paperback prices in most
cases. 86 This pricing did not affect the wholesale price Amazon paid to the
publishers-they still made a profit on each e-book "sold" to Amazon-but
Amazon lost money on most e-books as part of a strategy to build demand for
the e-book format and it made profits on the e-reader devices it sold.7
Under this model, e-books flourished while traditional books declined.
While the Amazon wholesale model was profitable for the book publishers,
two things about the future terrified them. E-books threatened to destroy the
traditional model of the book industry, which normally published best sellers
and prestige titles first in hard cover at $30 or more. It also had the potential
to upend the trade and mass-market paperback formats, which were sold at
decreasing price points. E-books would destroy this crude form of price
discrimination if consumers abandoned hardcover books for the new
medium, especially if Amazon used its growing dominance to eventually force
down the wholesale price of e-books.
In response to this threat to the status quo, five major publishers agreed
collectively, with the coordination of Apple, to switch to an agency model
where the publishers would set the retail price of e-books and provide Apple

8o.

Id. at 504.

81. Id. at 509-1o. For another example of the misuse of standards to block innovative new
entrants, see Am. Soc't of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
82. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 658-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal
docketed, Nos. 13-3741 (L), 13 -3 8 5 7 (CON), 14-6o, 14-61 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014).
83. Id. at 64 8.
84. Id. at 670.
85.

BRAD STONE, THE EvERYTHING STORE:JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 251 (2013).

86.

Id.

87.

Id. at 2 5 1-

5

2.
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with a 30% commission for each e-book sold. 88 The publishers further
collectively refused to do business with Amazon under the old wholesale price
model until Amazon switched to an agency-pricing model as well.8 9 Not
surprisingly, once Apple began selling e-books and Amazon agreed to the
publishers' demands, the price of e-books increased.9° The government
settled with all the publishers and went to trial against Apple. The court held
that the horizontal agreement by the publishers facilitated by Apple was
unlawful per se, imposed various types of injunctive relief, and appointed an
outside monitor to ensure compliance. The case is now on appeal.9,
The case is unusual and surprising from a number of perspectives. Some
commentators have criticized the government's failure to challenge Amazon's
dominance in the e-books market, which they see as provoking the publishers
into defensive price-fixing.9 A handful of commentators have even sought to
portray the publishers and Apple as the true innovators being unfairly
penalized by antitrust constraints.93
None of these critiques hold up in a two-stage Schumpeterian analysis of
innovation. First, it was Amazon who was the initial and successful innovator
in the e-books market. If Amazon has separately monopolized the market for
e-book readers or e-books through unlawful conduct, or unlawfully sought to
prevent subsequent waves of innovation from threatening that dominance,
the government has the tools of section 2 of the Sherman Act to deal with
those issues in a way that does not limit Amazon from continuing to innovate
in the e-books space.
While Apple's iPad is innovative, the horizontal e-book price and
distribution agreement by the publishers and Apple is not really innovation
at all. Rather it is merely the offering of an existing product (e-books) at a
higher price through an existing non-innovative pricing formula (agency
pricing). As Christopher Sagers noted: "[I] t is hard to imagine an efficiency
enhancing rationale for a horizontal agreement that does literally nothing
other than raise retail prices."94 Moreover, the government's decision not to
bring criminal charges against Apple or the publishers reflects a certain
leniency that may well have been motivated by recognition of the need not to
squelch Apple's innovation in hardware.

Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2dat6 5 8-61.
Id. at 670-73, 679-82.
90. Id. at 682.
91. See supranote 82.
92.
See generallyJohn B. Kirkwood, Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books,
and Antitrust Policy, 69 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (2014).
93. Geoffrey A. Manne & William Rinehart, The US E-Books Case Against Apple: The
ProcompetitiveStory, CONCURRENCES, Sept. 2012, at 18, 45.
88.
89.

94- Chris Sagers, Apple, Antitrust, and Irony 42 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/antitrust/pdfs/events/apple-anti
trust and irony.pdf.
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The E-Books case is a textbook illustration of how antitrust enforcement
can foster innovation and support a Schumpeterian vision of creative
destruction not just once, but in subsequent stages in an industry. E-books
were a significant threat to the publisher's long established business model of
time-delayed physical distribution. The publishers had become accustomed
to their critical role in production, inventory management, and distribution
of physical books and to their ability to extract consumer surplus through
price discrimination. These advantages were all threatened by e-books
distributed through either dedicated e-book readers or through digital
applications on general purpose devices such as tablets, smart phones, and
laptops. The publishers' agreement was merely a counter-strategy by the older
incumbents to maintain their print-based model as long as possible. They also
used it to bend Amazon into changing its innovative model by pushing it to
become part of the traditional chain of discounting and price discrimination
in different print and electronic formats. Either way, fans of Schumpeter
should rejoice rather than bemoan the limited but successful use of antitrust
to stop a fading incumbent industry from ganging up on an innovator well on
its way to destroying old products, pricing patterns, and old methods of
distributions.
D.

MUERGERS AND INNOVATION

Protecting and promoting innovation plays an important role in merger
enforcement. The 201o Horizontal Merger Guidelines explicitly discuss the
role of innovation in merger analysis and reflect both Arrow's view that
competition is a spur to innovation95 and Schumpeter's view that increased
size may well enable innovation that would not otherwise take place:
Competition often spursfirms to innovate.The Agencies may consider
whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by
encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below
the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. That
curtailment of innovation could take the form of reduced incentive
to continue with an existing product-development effort or reduced
incentive to initiate development of new products.
The first of these effects is most likely to occur if at least one of
the merging firms is engaging in efforts to introduce new products
that would capture substantial revenues from the other merging
firm. The second, longer-run effect is most likely to occur if at least
one of the merging firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it to
develop new products in the future that would capture substantial
revenues from the other merging firm. The Agencies therefore also
consider whether a merger will diminish innovation competition by

95.

ARROW, supranote ii, at 157.
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combining two of a very small number of firms with the strongest
capabilities to successfully innovate in a specific direction.
The Agencies evaluate the extent to which successful innovation
by one merging firm is likely to take sales from the other, and the
extent to which post-merger incentives for future innovation will be
lower than those that would prevail in the absence of the merger.
The Agencies also consider whether the merger is likely to enable innovation
that would not otherwise take place, by bringing together complementary
capabilitiesthat cannotbe otherwise combined orfor some other merger-specfic
6
reason.9
In deciding whether or not to challenge a merger, the Antitrust Division
and the FTC will generally consider any claimed efficiencies and innovations
that are verifiable, merger specific, and sufficient to overcome any predicted
anticompetitive effects of the merger or acquisition.97 The Guidelines caution
that projected efficiencies will rarely be sufficient to justify a merger to
monopoly or nearly so. In reality, they often function more as a tie-breaker
for the agencies and the court in close cases where anticompetitive harm is
8
limited and efficiencies are substantial.9
A merger policy informed by creative destruction should take into
account the risks that a merger will decrease incentives to innovate by
removing the threat of outside disruption. It should also recognize that an
increased capacity for innovation is one of the most important procompetitive efficiencies that may justify increased industry concentration.
Obviously, these propositions are somewhat conflicting and do not
accommodate any categorical acceptance or rejection of mergers. This
tension is particularly apparent in cases where a potentially dominant firm has
a plausible verifiable claim to be innovating through acquisition.
FTC v. H.J.Heinz Co., the baby-food merger case, is one example of a
prominent decision which might have come out differently with a more
explicit innovation focus. Here, Heinz acquired Beech-Nut in an attempt to
form a more vibrant and innovative firm that could compete more effectively
with the dominant firm, Gerber.99 The merger would have combined BeechNut's more innovative recipes with Heinz's newer, more efficient, and
underutilized manufacturing plant.
96. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 62, § 6.4 (emphasis added).
97. Id.§ so.
98. Id.; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F. 3 d 7o8, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(stating proof of "extraordinary efficiencies" is necessary in merger cases with high market
concentration); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1o98, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(seeking efficiencies that are "cognizable," "'substantiate[d]', and 'verif[iable] "' (alternations in
original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. DEP'T OFIJUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (2oo6), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/21 5 24 7 .htrm# 4 2.
99. H.J.Heinz Co., 24 6 F.3 d at 7 11-1 3 .
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The district court denied the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction,
citing the substantial potential for pro-competitive innovations and
efficiencies. °- On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed on two grounds. The D.C.

Circuit found that the merger amounted to a merger to monopoly for the
second slot for baby food on supermarket shelves and that the resulting
efficiencies were not as great as claimed. The court found that the argument
that Beech-Nut had better recipes was not merger specific, and thus not
relevant to the analysis.°, Even accepting the traditional merger analysis of
the court, the proposed merger may well have unleashed an innovative new
firm capable of launching a wave of creative destruction to an otherwise staid
market. 102
In contrast to the baby food case, the government's opposition to H&R
Block's acquisition of TaxAct seems justified on innovation grounds. Here,
the government successfully challenged the acquisition of the leading
provider of free software for preparation of tax returns, TaxAct, by H&R
Block, a leading tax preparation firm.,o3 TaxAct's position as a "maverick" in
the industry, and not its share of the tax preparation market, piqued the
government's interest in this case. Section 2.1.5 of the Guidelines state:
The Agencies consider whether a merger may lessen competition by
eliminating a "maverick" firm, i.e., a firm that plays a disruptive role
in the market to the benefit of customers. For example, if one of the
merging firms has a strong incumbency position and the other
merging firm threatens to disrupt market conditions with a new
technology or business model, their merger can involve the loss of
actual or potential competition.°4
A maverick is in essence a disruptive innovator or a current or likely
source of creative destruction in that industry. The firm may play the role of
a maverick through its pricing, its service, its willingness to introduce new
products, services, or methods of distribution.,°5 TaxAct was considered the
maverick because it offered a larger selection of features in its free tax return
software. The government worried that, following the acquisition, H&R Block
would be less likely to introduce new features for the free version of the

1oo.

See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 1 16 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000).

1o.

H.J.Heinz Co., 2 4 6F.3 dat722.

102.
See generallyJonathan B. Baker, Efficiencies and High Concentration:Heinz Proposes to Acquire
Beech-Nut, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 157 (John E.
KowkaJr. & LawrenceJ. White eds., 5 th ed. 2013).
103.

United Statesv. H &RBlock, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 201 1).

104.

2010

MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 62, § 2.1.5.

105. For example, the Justice Department challenged the AT&T-T-Mobile merger primarily
because ofT-Mobile's innovative marketing strategies. The merger was ultimately abandoned by the
parties. See MichaelJ. De La Merced, AT&TEnds $39 Billion Bidfor T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 19,
2011 , 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o 11/12/1 9/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-mobile.

2015]

PROMOTING INNOVATION

2243

TaxAct software., °6 In all likelihood, H&R Block would roll back existing
features of the free product following the acquisition to nudge customers
toward the premium software package.
A Schumpeterian perspective also provides a framework to assess the
issue of innovation through acquisition. The acquisition of start-ups and new
entrants by dominant established firms poses difficult questions from the
perspective of fostering innovation for both challengers and incumbents.
Consider Facebook's recent acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp'o7 and
Google's acquisitions of YouTube, ITA, and Waze. °S Reflexive opposition to
such acquisitions is a mistake. Challengers need the incentive of acquisition
(in addition to initial public offerings) as part of the inducement to innovate
in the first place. In addition, incumbents often have difficulty continuing to
innovate beyond sustaining innovations in their existing fields of dominance.
For example, Google had its own video service before it bought YouTube in
2oo6, but that smaller firm had four times as many users and a strong brand.
Finally, incumbents often have resources beyond the capabilities of new
entrants to fully bring the innovation to market. Google, for its part was in a
much better position to face down YouTube's mounting legal challenges and
develop more cooperative relationships with content providers.
At the same time the agencies and courts need the skill and the will to
carefully scrutinize such acquisitions when the predominant motive or likely
effect is the removal of a disruptive innovator and the maintenance or
extension of the existing dominance. Would the result of the Microsoft
litigation really have been any different if it had simply acquired Netscape and
Sun Microsystems, rather than excluding them from the market through the
means they ultimately chose?
When Facebook offered close to one billion dollars for the photo-sharing
service Instagram in 2012'09 it was difficult to see how a company with a
handful of employees and no revenue could be worth that much. Instagram
had quickly built up a user base of over 30 million users, and although the
io6.

H&R.Block,83 F. Supp. 2dat 29.
Olson, Facebook Closes $i9 Billion WhatsApp Deal FORBES (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://wwwforbes.com/sites/parmyolson/ 2014/1 o/o6/facebook-closes-i 9 -billion-whatsapp-deal/;
Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $i Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:15 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 201 2/o4/o9/facebook-buys-instagram-for-l-billion/; see also Robert
107.

Parmy

Hof, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, Instagram Try to Explain How They Don't Really Compete, FORBES
(Mar. 25, 2015, 7:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2o1 5 /03/2 5 /dont-facebook-

messenger-whatsapp-and-instagram-all-compete-with-each-other/.
lo8. Google and ITA Software Sign Acquisition Agreement, GOOGLE

(July 1, 201o),
http://investor.google.com/releases/2o1o/o7o1.html; Ingrid Lunden, Google Bought Waze for
$i. iB, Giving a Social Data Boost to Its Mapping Business, TECHCRUNCH (Jun. 11, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/201 3 /o6/1 1/its-official-google-buys-waze-giving-a-social-data-boost-to-itslocation-and-mapping-business/; Paul R. La Monica, Google to Buy YouTube for $r.65 Billion, CNN
MONEY (Oct. 9, 2oo6, 5:43 PM), http://money.cnn.COm/2oo6/lo/o9/technology/google
youtubedeal/index.htm?cnn=yes.
109.
Rusli, supranote 107.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

2244

[Vol. 100:2223

service was not a general-purpose social network, it would only have taken a
few extra functions to make it one. One could speculate that Facebook was
willing to pay so much for Instagram simply to stop it from falling into the
hands of rivals, especially Twitter and Google.Ilo Likewise, one could
speculate that Google's recent billion dollar acquisition of the Israeli traffic
and navigation app Waze may have had as much to do with keeping decent
mapping technology away from Apple and Facebook as to supplement
Google's own mapping data. Suspicion alone does not justify scuttling a
merger, but it certainly warrants investigation.
To preserve the proper incentives for both challengers and incumbents
the agencies and the courts must use the innovation lens when applicable to
judge both legality and the proper remedy (structural versus behavioral) to
judge such acquisitions. One of the most complex examples of the role of
innovation came in the 20 1 o Google-ITA acquisition. ITA was the developer
of the QPX software, the industry standard for airline pricing and comparison
systems. ITA's software was the basis for most of the leading Internet travel
sites such as Expedia, Travelocity, Kayak, and TripAdviser.11 Prior to the
acquisition Google was not in the on-line travel space, although it was, of
course, the leading Internet search engine and seller of on-line advertising.
Google planned to use the acquisition to launch its own on-line travel
aggregation site.
The Justice Department's antitrust challenge to the acquisition focused
squarely on innovation. The complaint alleged:
The proposed merger will give Google the means and incentive to
use its ownership of QPX to foreclose or disadvantage its prospective
flight search rivals by degrading their access to QPX, or denying
them access to QPX altogether. As a result, the proposed merger is
likely to result in reduced quality, variety, and innovation for
consumers of comparative flight search service.- 2
The eventual settlement and consent decree also focused on
innovation.,1 The consent decree required Google to honor all existing
licenses of its now rivals, negotiate extension of such licenses on similar terms
to those in effect prior to the merger, and to negotiate other terms of the
extensions that were fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory ("FRAND").,,4
11 o. Twitter reportedly offered $500 million for Instagram. Ankur Kapoor, Why the FTC Is
Investigating the Facebook/InstagramDeal, FORBES (May 22, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/ericsavitz/20 12/05/2 2/why-the-ftc-is-investigating-the-facebookinstagram-deal/.
iii.
2011 ),

112.

Complaint at 2-3, United States v. Google Inc., No. 1: 11-cv-oo688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
WL 1338047, availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f26 9 600/26 9 618.pdf.
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Id. at
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113. See generally Proposed Final Judgment, Google Inc., No. 1:1 1-cv-oo688 (D.D.C. Apr. is,
201 1), available athttp://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f26 9 600/2696 3 2.pdf.
1 14. Final Judgment at 13, Google Inc., No. i: 11 -cv-oo688 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 201 1), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2758oo/275897.pdf.
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Similarly, all new licenses and upgrades had to be on FRAND terms.
Moreover, the merged entities were required to continue investing in the
development of a next-generation software system called InstaSearch that ITA
was working on at the time of the acquisition and to license that new product
on FRAND terms.,5
IV. A MATTER OF PRIORITIES MORE THAN DOCTRINE
As Herbert Hovenkamp and others have noted, if innovation produces
the greatest impact on economic growth and development, then restraints on
innovation produce the greatest economic harm and should be the priority
for antitrust enforcement." 6 Operationalizing this principle is challenging,
particularly in decentralized enforcement systems like the United States.
The first step is prioritizing innovation for both federal enforcement
agencies. This should happen notjust in their case investigations, but also in
their competition advocacy as well., ,7 Innovation should be, and already is, a
priority in the selection of the major recent unilateral conduct cases.
Prioritizing innovation in section 1 enforcement probably requires slightly deemphasizing cartel enforcement in small and local industries, which do not
raise important innovation issues and reallocating resources toward criminal
and civil section i cases such as e-books and other restraints on innovations.
Similarly, in merger cases innovation issues will, at the margin, help guide the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion toward the elimination of mavericks and
away from legitimate merger-specific innovations. More extensive use of
closing statements by the enforcement agencies when innovation concerns
lead away from enforcement or toward unusual behavioral consent decrees
should be the norm rather than exception.
Innovation should be front and center in competition advocacy as well.
This is the principal method by which competition agencies can guide the
sound development of regulatory policy at the federal, state, and local level.
Such advocacy may yield even greater returns to innovation than the episodic
enforcement of antitrust law.
A recent example of FTC action in local transportation markets is
illustrative. Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, and other web-based car service matching
networks have sprung up in many metropolitan areas offering an application
allowing consumers to see available taxis and private drivers in their

1 15.
See id. at 15. The terms of the consent decree are discussed at greater length in Spencer
Weber Waller, Access and Information Remedies in High-Tech Antitrust, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 575,

581-84 (2012).
116. Hovenkamp, supra note 2o, at 8-9 (discussing how antitrust enforcement should be
wary that a "restrainton innovation can do much more harm" than price fixing and other
inefficiencies (emphasis in original)).
117.
See Disruptive Innovation Part 2: What Role for Regulators and Competition Policy?,

JUDEOECONOMICS (Feb. 7,

2014),

http://judoeconomics.wordpress.com/2o14/02/07/disruptive-
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immediate area and book a point-to-point ride for a metered fare over their
cell phone and receive an estimated pick up time from the driver. These
matching services are used by licensed taxis and car services as an additional
source of fares to cruising the streets or relying on radio dispatch, they are
also used by private drivers-a new source of supply for local transportation
markets.
These web-based transportation services have produced fierce opposition
from existing licensed cab and limousine companies. These companies argue
that the new competitors are exploiting customers with premium pricing
during high demand periods, failing to conduct background checks or
require commercial licenses, and not providing adequate insurance for the
drivers in the new networks. While some of these concerns are valid, most of
the underlying opposition is economic in nature and resulted in outright
bans, requirements to operate as licensed taxis, or additional tight regulation
of these new services in many cities.
The FTC's response has been a series of thoughtful comments submitted
to the local taxi and limousine commissions. The comments argue for the
minimal regulation necessary to satisfy health and safety concerns but warn
against overregulation, which protects incumbents from innovative new forms
of competition."II
Competition advocacy is more easily scalable than enforcement. The FTC
can submit comments and testify around the country cost-effectively since the
restraints produced by the incumbent taxi industry are fairly consistent
nationwide. Promoting innovation should be given priority where the
agencies have to make tough resource and strategy choices.
Guiding the exercise of agency resources is relatively easy in comparison
to private enforcement beyond direct agency control. Courts must take
private cases as they come and cannot pick and choose their agenda or
priorities. However, they can use plausible innovation claims as more than a
tie-breaker and at the same time insist on the substantiation of such claims by
the parties. This means dominant firms do not get a free pass merely because
they can articulate such a claim when the challenger can demonstrate harm
to disruptive innovation. But it also means that challengers do not
automatically prevail with rhetoric alone in the face of plausible claims that
they are seeking to duplicate rather than supplant the dominant firm.
V.

CONCLUSION

Innovation is a process that does not end. In the long run innovation, is
the most important driver of both competition and economic growth. Despite
nearly universal agreement on this premise, the competition policy

1 18.

See, e.g., FTC Staff Submits Comments to Chicago City Council on Proposed Regulation of

TransportationNetwork Providers,FED. TRADE COMM'N (April 21, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/newseven ts/press-releases/2o 1 4 /o4/ftc-staff-submits-comments-chicago-city-council-proposed.
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community is still seeking to come to grips with what this means for the rules
and enforcement of competition law. We offer an unconventional
interpretation of Schumpeter's pioneering work on this issue not just to
validate much of current antitrust law and enforcement, but to offer
suggestions as to how to better focus on innovation as a competition issue.
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